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Abstract 
 
 Both Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) and Wireless 
Sensor Network (WSN) are multi-hop wireless 
networks. WMN is an emerging community based 
integrated broadband wireless network which ensures 
high bandwidth ubiquitous internet provision to users, 
while, WSN is application specific and ensures large 
scale real-time data processing in complex 
environment. Both these wireless networks have some 
common vulnerable features which may increase the 
chances of different sorts of security attacks. Wireless 
sensor nodes have computation, memory and power 
limitations, which do not allow for implementation of 
complex security mechanism.  
In this paper, we discuss the common limitations 
and vulnerable features of WMN and WSN, along with 
the associated security threats and possible 
countermeasures. We also propose security 
mechanisms keeping in view the architecture and 
limitations of both. This article will serve as a baseline 
guide for the new researchers who are concern with 
the security aspects of WMN and WSN. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Security aspects of multi-hop wireless networks such 
as WMNs and WSNs are gaining interests of 
researchers as there are still numerous unresolved 
issues which needed to be addresses before large scale 
exploitation take place. WMN is an integrated 
broadband technology which not only provides high 
 
 
bandwidth internet facility to users but also integration 
of other wired and wireless networks such as IEEE 
802.11, IEEE 802.16, IEEE 802.15, and LANs. Special 
features of WMN include its low cost, easily 
deployable, self-healing and self-configuring network. 
WSN is purpose-based application-specific wireless 
network which ensure large scale real time data 
processing in complex environment. Few applications 
of WSN are traffic controlling, habitat monitoring, 
flood informing, health care etc. However, both these 
tremendous wireless networks face critical security 
challenges due to their few vulnerable characteristics, 
which the attackers try to exploit and bring serious 
performance degradation. Three common security 
requirements for any wireless networks are 
confidentiality, data integrity and service availability 
[5]. Confidentiality deals with end-users traffic and it 
ensure that the traffic is not listened or viewed by any 
entity except the intended recipient. Confidentiality is 
protected by using strong authentication and encryption 
mechanisms. Data integrity ensures that the packets are 
received by the receiver in the same format and 
sequence as sent by the sender, here the purpose is to 
keep the attackers away from packets modifications, 
alteration, disruption and absorption. Data integrity is 
mostly dependent on the underlying routing protocols. 
Availability is the feature which makes sure that the 
network and network resources are always available to 
end-users without any delay or interference. Three 
major types of security threats have been observed in 
wireless networks especially multi-hop wireless 
networks such as WMN and WSN, i.e. passive, active 
and DoS security threats. Passive attacks compromise 
the confidentiality by stealing information over the 
wireless medium using tools like sniffers. Passive 
attacks are very difficult to detect as they are silent in 
nature and do not harm the network. Active attacks 
compromise the data integrity by modifying, 
tempering, altering the packets. Such attacks mostly 
exploit the weaknesses in routing protocols. DoS 
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attacks compromise availability by reducing or 
stopping the network services and resources to 
legitimate users. The multi-hop wireless networks are 
more vulnerable to all these security attacks and 
exploitations. Being a broadband wireless network, the 
security of WMN is highly important as it is directly 
providing services to hundreds and thousands of end-
users. At the same time, we cannot overlook the 
security aspect of WSN, as medical monitoring, 
industrial automation and military applications 
emphasize the need to secure the sensor networks. 
There is a real need to address the security related 
issues prior to the commercial deployment of such 
multi-hop networks. We propose security mechanisms 
exclusively for WMN and WSN, keeping the 
limitations and challenges of these networks. Our 
proposed security system for WMN is based on detects 
and response, i.e. detect the intrusion and take 
appropriate action. The proposed security system for 
WSN is a security agent in the gateway, as gateway is 
the most important component of sensor networks, as 
all the traffic from the sensor node is routed to sink 
through the gateway.     
This article presents three principal findings. First, 
the common vulnerable characteristics of WMN and 
WSN are pointed out. Second, all possible security 
attacks and possible defenses are described. Finally, we 
propose two security mechanisms for WMN and WSN.  
 
2. Common vulnerable features of WMN 
and WSN 
 
WMN and WSN are both multi-hop infrastructure-
based wireless networks; however both have significant 
different purposes and objectives. WMN is integrated 
broadband wireless network which not only ensures 
high bandwidth internet provision to the end users but 
also form integration between other wired and wireless 
networks such as LANs, WLANs, WMANs and 
cellular networks. The important special features of 
WMN are its self-healing, self-configuring, easy 
deployment, low cost and de-centralized architecture.  
 WSN is application specific and are specially 
designed to serve in emergency environments such as 
battle field, flood alarming, habitat monitoring, health 
care etc. sensor nodes are generally small in size 
having little memory and computation power, and are 
densely deployed in the coverage area so that to get 
accurate results and figures.   
WMN perform three levels of operations for internet 
provision to the end users, i.e. the gateways form the 
top-levels and are connected with the wired network 
infrastructure for internet access. The middle levels 
constitute the mesh routers which form the multi-hop 
structure for giving access to the end-users. End-users 
mesh nodes form the lowest level. Two types of mesh 
nodes exist in WMN, one type of mesh nodes are 
directly connected with the mesh routers if they are in 
the direct communication range of mesh routers, if 
some nodes are not in the direct communication range 
of mesh routers, then WMN support the ad-hoc 
connectivity amongst the mesh nodes, i.e. the mesh 
nodes can connect with the wireless network trough 
other mesh nodes.  
WSN operates in the same level, i.e. there are no 
particular routers or gateways; however all the nodes 
communicate with each other having router’s 
capabilities for relaying data for each other. Few of 
sensor nodes may perform the gateways functionalities 
and all the nodes send the collected data towards the 
sink through the gateways. Sink is a repository, which 
keeps all the collected data and figures to scientifically 
predict the outcomes.  
Although, the physical setup, topologies, operations 
and routing mechanisms are different in WMN and 
WSN, but still both posses some common vulnerable 
characteristics and security challenges which may 
compromise the confidentiality, data integrity and 
service availability, and are mention in this section.  
A. Wireless Medium 
Both WMN and WSN use frequency band for 
wireless communication. In WMN, mesh nodes are 
either connected wirelessly with mesh routers or 
another mesh node using 2.4 GHz free frequency band.  
In WSN, nodes are connected with each other, and 
the traffic pattern is toward the sink through the 
gateways, uses variable bands of frequency depending 
upon the nature and type of application, as for example, 
the WSN used for animal tracking or habitat 
monitoring uses 174 MHz, while most of the alarming 
sensor nodes use 434 MHz frequency band.  
Jamming and scrambling are common security 
threats for the wireless medium of WSN and WMN. In 
jamming, the attacker uses a specialized hardware 
device to introduce a strong noise so that to create 
serious interference in the communication channels [1]. 
Scrambling is periodical short term jamming in which 
the strong noise is introduces after specified interval of 
time, hence the communication channels of wireless 
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medium work for some time and stop working during 
the period of scrambling.  
As a whole jamming and scrambling is used as a 
weapon against the wireless networks particularly in 
WMN and WSN, it can be used for jamming 
• Mesh nodes to isolate them from network 
services and resources. 
• Mesh routers to isolate a portion of network. 
• Mesh gateways to completely bring down the 
broadband services and resources. 
• Sensor nodes to isolate them from the rest of 
the network. 
• Sensor gateways to stop the traffic flows toward 
the sink. 
Here the low intensity jamming attack is against the 
sensor and mesh nodes, while the most severe type is 
the jamming attack against the mesh and sensor 
gateways, as jamming gateways mean that the complete 
network is down.   
In wireless networks, the strategy is that to keep the 
location of the gateway hidden so that to prevent the 
physical damage and jamming kinds of attacks, as 
gateways are the core and most important backbone 
devices. However, the attackers locate the gateways [3] 
by first conducting a passive homing attack. In homing 
attack, the intruder passively monitors and observes the 
traffic pattern in the network, as in both WMN and 
WSN; the traffic pattern is from nodes toward the 
gateways. After successful homing attack, now the 
attacker is aware of the gateways locations, and hence 
jamming is possible. 
    
B. Cooperative MAC 
 
Both WMN and WSN use cooperative MAC 
(Medium Access Control) protocol at data link layer, 
which is shared amongst all the nodes in 
communication. This cooperative MAC gives rise to 
hidden node terminal and collusion of packets. For 
example, nodes A and B are in the communication 
range of C, but A and B are not in direct 
communication range of each other, that is why, nodes 
A and B are not aware of each other, and both want to 
send data through node C, here either both will transmit 
simultaneously and hence packet collision would occur, 
or node A is communicating with node C, hence node 
B is unable to transmit its data unless node A has 
finished the session. Ready To Send / Clear To Send 
(RTS/CTS) mechanism was introduced to solve the 
problem of hidden node terminal, as first the node 
would send a RTS signal to the communicating node, 
and if received the CTS signal, which means that no 
any other node is transmitting the data, hence the node 
can transmit the data. However, MAC with RTS/CTS 
still faces the problem of exposed node terminal, which 
needs to be resolved.  
In WMN and WSN, the attackers exploit the 
cooperative MAC with RTS/CTS for launching many 
security attacks.  
• The nodes can flood the packets of RTS 
toward the target node, as a result the target 
node will reply to each of the RTS with 
CTS, hence creating extra overheads on the 
bandwidth, computation processing and 
power consumption.  
• The malicious node can capture the MAC 
channel for indefinite period and continuous 
transmission; hence other nodes are unable 
to participate in the communication process.  
• The exposed node problem is still not fully 
solved, and if a malicious node acts as an 
exposed node, it can stop the 
communication process of innocent nodes.  
The cooperative MAC and the RTS/CTS 
mechanisms can seriously degrade the performance of 
WSN as compared to WMN. The data received in 
WSN are mostly dependent on the observation and the 
captured information of the sensor nodes; hence the 
results of the received data can be seriously corrupted 
if the strategically important nodes in WSN become the 
victim of selfish MAC behavior, and are unable to 
communicate.  
C. Multi-hop environment  
 
Both WMN and WSN are multi-hop wireless 
networks. Data traffic passes in hop by hop pattern 
toward the destination. Multi-hop architecture is 
necessary for easy and rapid deployment, as well as it 
also reduce the deployment cost, as the nodes have the 
flexibility of self-healing, self-configuring and self-
adjusting. This feature also greatly increase the 
reliability, as there exist many paths between the source 
and destination, and in case of any path failure, there 
exists alternate paths between source and destination to 
carry out the communication. On the other heads, this 
feature also has three negative aspects; 
• Routing overheads increases 
• Security risks increases  
• Bandwidth decreases  
The main security threats due to the multi-hop nature of 
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WMN and WSN are 
• Blackhole attack [6], in which the malicious 
node drops all the traffic.  
• Greyhole attack, in which the malicious nodes 
selectively drop the network traffic 
• Wormhole attack [7], in which two distant 
malicious nodes form a fast communication 
link, capture the packets at one end, forward 
to the other through the fast link, and replayed 
the packets there to create routing disruption 
[6].  
• False route creation attack, in which malicious 
nodes create false and non-existing routes 
between source and destination.  
• Sybil attack, in which a malicious nodes show 
many identities at a time, so create routing 
loops [8].  
These multi-hop routing attacks can be of serious 
consequences if launched against WSN in emergency 
situations such as health care or battle field. However, 
the severity of such attacks will be worst if the 
blackhole or greyhole malicious nodes exist near the 
gateway of the WSN, hence, most of the traffic would 
be either dropped or selectively forwarded to the sink.  
 
D. Power limitations 
As WSN consist of tiny nodes, which have limited or 
definite battery power. The sensor nodes conserve the 
energy by going to sleep-mode when there is no data to 
transmit. The energy consume when sensor nodes 
transmit the data, hence their radios are on for this 
purpose.  
In WMN, the mesh nodes may be static or mobile. 
Generally static nodes have no power limitations; 
however the mobile mesh nodes have power 
constraints. 
The attackers can seriously degrade the performance 
of WSN, if strategically important nodes are under 
sleep-deprivation attack [9]. In this attack, the 
attacker’s usually forward un-necessary packets 
towards the target node so that to keep its radios on, 
hence consumes its battery power to completely drain 
and makes it unable to take part in the communication 
process.  
The WSN has serious concerns regarding power 
limitations as compared to WMN nodes, as in WSN, all 
the nodes are power constrained, which is not the case 
in WMN.   
As WMN support both static and mobile nodes, here 
the mobile nodes have limited supply and life of 
battery, however, if any mobile node of WMN is under 
sleep deprivation attack, it is of less severity and 
consequences limited to the mobile node only, i.e. the 
network operations remain unaffected.  
The limitations, attacks and possible defenses are 
given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Limitations, security concerns and possible 
defenses  
Limitations  Security concerns  Defenses  
Wireless 
Medium 
Jamming Spread spectrum 
Frequency hoping  
Cooperative 
MAC 
Selfishness  Multi-radio multi 
channel 
Cognitive radios  
IEEE 802.16 
mechanism  
Multi-hop Blackhole, 
greyhole, 
Rushing, Sybil  
Secure routing protocol  
Power Sleep deprivation  IDS agent  
    
3. Possible research directions 
 
Some facts needs to be considered before designing 
and proposing any security mechanism for WMN, such 
as 
• As a large scale broadband network, WMN 
consists of fixed backbone mesh routers and 
gateways infrastructure, which is not power 
constraint. 
• Majority of mesh nodes are static which have 
no power limitations; however there is also 
support for mobile nodes. 
• WMN is an integrated technology, which can 
enable integration amongst other wireless 
networks such as IEEE 802.11 WLANs, IEEE 
802.16 WMANs. 
• In WMN, most of the traffic is from gateways 
toward the users for Internet services.  
• Throughput reduction for longer hop 
communication 
 
For WMN, there is a need of such security 
mechanism, which considers the three level operations 
as discussed earlier. The lower level mesh nodes and 
the middle level mesh routers are more vulnerable to 
most of the security attacks. Any proposed solution 
should be defined by adapting the fundamental 
operational nature of the WMN, the proposed security 
systems must meet the security requirement and 
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perform well in the multi-hop, large scale, integrated 
broadband environment of WMN.   
In case of WSN, some important facts needs to be 
considered before designing and proposing any security 
mechanism such as 
• As an application specific network, WSN 
consists of hundred and thousands of sensor 
nodes densely deployed in the sensor field.  
• Majority of sensor nodes are static having 
power limitations. 
• In WSN, most of the traffic is from node to 
nodes toward the sink through the fateway 
gateways.  
• The security of the gateway is much more 
important than the nodes, as all the traffic 
passes through the gateways.  
• The low memory and computation power limits 
the scope of heavy security mechanisms. 
Keeping in view the characteristics, multi-hop 
architecture, dynamic topologies of WSN and WMN, 
some sort of security mechanisms needs to be 
investigated which are capable to ensure secure 
communication. Some possible research directions are 
listed below. 
• The advance anti-jamming techniques such as 
frequency hopping and spread spectrum are 
the best solution to prevent jamming and 
scrambling attacks. However, these solutions 
can only be used in WMN, but not practical 
for WSN. The WSN nodes are lower power, 
low cost, and these techniques require high 
energy consumption and increase the design 
complexity [2].  One solution can be to put 
the sensor nodes in sleep mode and wake 
them after some time to check that the 
jamming attack is still in existence or ended 
so that to increase the battery life of the 
sensor nodes, however this cannot prevent the 
DoS attack [3]. One of the possible 
mechanism to protect WSN against jamming 
is the investigation of jamming-detection and 
alarming mechanism in few of the superior 
sensor nodes having more memory, 
computation and power resources than the 
others, and are deployed around the boundary 
of sensor field so that to sense the jamming 
attack and to inform the appropriate person. 
This kind of mechanism would be helpful to 
mitigate such attacks and avoid large scale 
exploitation.  
• Some mechanisms needs to be investigated for 
WSN and WMN so that to eliminate the 
factor of selfish MAC. For WMN, IEEE 
802.16 MAC mechanism can be consider, 
which uses TDMA and TDM for uplink and 
downlink, and ensure collision free 
transmission. Multi-radio multi-channel could 
also be a good candidate in WMN to be 
considered and investigated. Cognitive radio 
design and implementation is another 
potential area to be evaluated [4]. In WSN, 
there is a need to reduce the chances of 
indefinite channel capturing and RTS/CTS 
flooding attack, and are highly challenging 
research area.   
• To overcome the overheads of multi-hop in 
WSN and WMN, the most efficient solution 
would be the implementation of secure 
routing protocol which is capable of secure-
path selection, and which is proposed keeping 
in view the limitations and challenges 
imposed by the multi-hop complexity.  
• Most of the serious attacks in WMN and WSN 
can be countered by using Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS), which is capable to detect the 
intrusion and inform the appropriate 
controller for action. However, the IDS 
design must consider the complexities and 
challenges of WMN and WSN environment, 
also the accuracy and timely detection of any 
risk are the key factors of secure IDS. For 
WMN, the IDS can be implemented either in 
mesh nodes to individually counter the 
security attacks, or can be implemented in 
mesh router to monitor all the in-range mesh 
nodes for misbehavior. In WSN, due to its 
inherit limitations regarding memory, power 
and computation, individual IDS in sensor 
nodes are practically not possible, however, 
the research community may try to investigate 
an IDS for the sensor gateways, which is 
capable to monitor the surrounding nodes of 
the gateway for misbehavior.   
4. Conclusions  
 
Both WMN and WSN are multi-hop wireless 
networks having some common limitations and 
challenges. The open wireless medium, multi-hop 
architecture, power restrictions and cooperative and 
shared MAC are such characteristics which impose 
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many security challenges in them. The security 
challenges may be physical threats such as jamming 
and scrambling, MAC related risks such as MAC 
selfishness or exploitation of RTS/CTS mechanism, 
routing attacks such blackhole, greyhole, sybile, and 
sleep-deprivation attacks to drain the power resources. 
Spread spectrum, frequency hopping, or cognitive 
radios may be considered to prevent the jamming 
attacks, but these techniques are not suitable for WSN 
due to the simplicity and low power of the sensor 
nodes. Routing attacks due to the multi-hop 
architectural complexity can be solved by secure 
routing protocols for WSN and WMN. Intrusion 
detection system can be a good candidate to be 
considered for these multi-hop wireless networks, 
however, such mechanism may not be more feasible for 
WSN; as such mechanism may increase the design 
complexity of sensor nodes, however can be 
investigated for sensor gateways. There is a real need 
for such security mechanism which are proposed and 
designed keeping in view the limitations and challenges 
of WSN and WMN.  
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